Passphrase Generator

Generate a passphrase you can actually remember, from a 2,384-word list using the browser's cryptographic randomness. Words are drawn by rejection sampling rather than a modulo, which sounds fussy until you notice that a modulo quietly favours some words over others and makes the strength figure an overstatement. The entropy shown is computed from the real list length at runtime, so it cannot drift from the list it describes — about 11.2 bits per word, which puts six words at 67 bits. Two things the arithmetic is honest about: capitalising every word adds nothing, because it is a fixed rule rather than a choice, and appending a digit adds about 3.3 bits, which is a third of what one more word would give you.

Words against strength

WordsEntropyOffline guessing
4~45 bitsWeeks
5~56 bitsCenturies
6~67 bitsFar beyond practical
7~79 bitsFar beyond practical
+ a digit+3.3 bitsA third of one word

When to use it

  1. Make a master password you can memorise.
  2. Create a device or disk encryption passphrase.
  3. Generate a Wi-Fi password people have to read aloud.
  4. Produce a recovery phrase for a password manager.
  5. Replace a password that has to be typed on a games console or TV.

How to Use

  1. Choose how many words — six is a good default.
  2. Pick a separator, and add a digit only if a form demands one.
  3. Generate, and store it in a password manager.

Features

  1. 2,384 common words, about 11.2 bits each
  2. Unbiased rejection sampling, not a modulo
  3. Entropy computed from the real list length
  4. Separator, capitalisation, digit and symbol options
  5. Offline crack-time estimate
  6. Several suggestions at once
  7. Nothing transmitted

FAQs

How many words do I need?

Six gives about 67 bits, which is beyond offline brute force for the foreseeable future. Four gives 45, fine for something rate-limited but not for anything that could be stolen as a hash. Seven or eight for a master password or disk encryption.

Is a passphrase really stronger than a password?

At the same memorability, comfortably. Six random words are around 67 bits; a typical human-chosen password with substitutions is nearer 30, because the substitutions are predictable and guessing tools apply them. The strength comes from the randomness, not the length.

Does capitalising the words help?

Not for strength, and the entropy figure here does not move when you turn it on. Capitalising every word is a rule an attacker can apply too. It is offered because some systems demand a capital, not because it adds security.

Should I add a number or a symbol?

Only if a form makes you. A digit adds about 3.3 bits and a symbol about 3.2 — together, less than one extra word, and they make it harder to type and remember. Another word is the better trade.

Is the randomness real?

It comes from crypto.getRandomValues, the browser's cryptographic generator, and is drawn by rejection sampling so no word is more likely than another. The common shortcut of taking a random number modulo the list length is measurably biased.

Does it matter that the wordlist is public?

No, and assuming otherwise is a mistake. The entropy figure already assumes the attacker knows both the list and the method — the security is in which words came up, not in hiding where they came from.

Is the passphrase sent anywhere?

No. It is generated in the page and never transmitted.

Technical Details

Words are drawn with `crypto.getRandomValues` and rejection sampling. The obvious version — a random 32-bit number modulo the list length — is biased whenever the length does not divide evenly into 2^32, because the low values then occur slightly more often than the high ones. On a wordlist that skews which words appear, which means the entropy printed on the page would be higher than the entropy actually delivered; rejection sampling costs a loop and removes the bias entirely. The strength figure is computed as the word count times the base-2 logarithm of the real list length, read from the array at runtime rather than quoted as a constant, so the number shown cannot drift away from the list it describes. This list holds 2,384 words at about 11.2 bits each — between the EFF short list's 1,296 and its long list's 7,776 — and every word is common, three to eight letters and lowercase, chosen so a passphrase can be typed from memory and read aloud without ambiguity. Two honesty points are built into the arithmetic. Capitalising every word adds no entropy at all: it is a fixed rule applied to every passphrase, not a per-word choice, so the attacker's search space is unchanged and the figure does not move. Appending a digit adds log2(10), about 3.3 bits — roughly a third of one extra word, which is worth knowing before adding one instead of lengthening the phrase. Crack time is quoted for an offline attacker at 10^11 guesses a second, because that is the case that matters: an online service rate-limits, so the relevant number is the one for a stolen password database, and it assumes the attacker knows both the wordlist and the method, which is the only assumption worth making. Nothing is generated on a server and nothing is transmitted.

Security Tools

Security Tools

  • JWT Generator & Decoder
  • CSP Generator
  • security.txt Generator
  • AES Encryption
  • Bcrypt Hash Generator
  • BIP39 Mnemonic Generator
  • CVSS Calculator
  • CORS Debugger